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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015

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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
TRIDENT ISSUES, CASTOR-PK AND VANDENBERG, NOVEMBER 7, 2005

REF: A. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017)

[1](#)B. GENEVA 2748 (JCIC-XXVII-042)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-043.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 7, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 5:40 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting, followed by a Working Group meeting, were held at the Russian Mission on November 7, 2005 to discuss the U.S. and Russian proposals for Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) procedures (REF A), Peacekeeper (PK) Elimination, Castor 120 Stages, the attribution of silo launchers to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility, and the Russian proposal for inspections of Trident SLBMs in Containers (REF B).

[1](#)4. (S) The discussions on the two Trident issues were a follow-on to the morning discussions (REF B). The Parties agreed that the Trident in Containers issue was close to resolution, but there was still a major difference regarding the number of SLBMs to be removed from their container each year under the policy arrangement. Therefore, the Parties agreed to continue to work the issue during the intersession.

[1](#)5. (S) The discussions on Trident RVOSI reached substantive agreement with modified language over the measurement procedures used with the Trident RVOSI measurement device to the Russian-proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement (CPS). The Parties agreed to provide Joint Draft Text (JDT) of the CPS at the next meeting based on the understandings of today's meetings.

[1](#)6. (S) In the discussions of PK ICBMs, Russia de-linked the Peacekeeper elimination issue from the Castor 120 issue, and took Peacekeeper off the table for the time being. Russia said it reserved the right to raise the issue later. The U.S. Delegation stated that the United States has no plans in the future to eliminate Peacekeeper ICBMs.

[1](#)7. (S) With regard to Castor 120 Stages, the Russian Delegation noted that the issue was close to resolution and the issue boiled down to two remaining points: not locating Castor 120 at ICBM bases; and the U.S. providing the number and location of Castor 120 stages produced.

[1](#)8. (S) On Vandenberg Silo attribution, the Russian Delegation reasserted its position that the U.S. action contradicts the fundamental provisions of the Treaty. The Russian Delegation declared that the U.S.-proposed visit to the silos attributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility (SLF) would not be feasible or useful.

COULD IT BE END-GAME
ON TRIDENT II RVOSI?

[1](#)9. (S) Boryak opened the HOD meeting by welcoming the two heads of delegation from Ukraine and Belarus, who had arrived for the JCIC session that day. After opening remarks, Taylor said he was pleased by the progress made in the working group regarding Trident RVOSI procedures and that the Parties were close to resolving the issue. He noted that the Russian-proposed option allowing for both groups of inspectors to take one measurement each, then averaging the two measurements for the official measurement, was acceptable

to the United States. Taylor said there were a few non-substantive changes within the Russian-proposed wording that needed to be made. He handed over the following U.S.-proposed text, which was a U.S.-proposed version of the paper the Russian Delegation provided at the morning meeting.

Begin text:

JCIC-XXVII
U.S.-Proposed Language
November 7, 2005

Each group will then separately observe as facility personnel take one measurement to determine the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor, as was done during the demonstration.

If the result of each measurement differs by no more than three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, the two measurements are averaged to determine the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor.

If the result of either measurement differs by more than three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, additional measurements are taken in the presence of the group observing the measurement, until a measurement is obtained that differs from the benchmark measurement by no more than three centimeters. The two measurements are averaged to determine the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor.

The measurement taken for each group and the average obtained for the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor are recorded in the inspection report.

End text.

10. (S) Taylor said that if the revision was acceptable to the Parties, the U.S. Delegation would consider this issue resolved and would provide a U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text.

11. (S) Boryak provided the U.S.-suggested language on a portion of the CPS to his experts to review and provide a response later in the meeting. Boryak moved on to the PK and Castor 120 issues.

PEACEKEEPER ELIMINATION

12. (S) Boryak began the discussion of PK eliminations stating that the Parties had worked hard for resolution of the issue. He said that, should the U.S. Delegation provide assurances that it had no plans to eliminate PK ICBMs, the Russian Delegation could consider the matter removed from the table and further consideration during JCIC. Boryak said the U.S. Delegation had not made a steadfast statement in JCIC stating its absence of elimination plans. Taylor responded, unequivocally, that the U.S. has no plans to eliminate PK ICBMs at this time.

CASTOR-120, HERE WE GO AGAIN

13. (S) Boryak noted that the Parties were not far apart on Castor 120, as of JCIC-XXVI, and that this issue could be resolved if there was sufficient goodwill. He said the issue boiled down to two remaining points: a U.S. statement that it would not locate Castor 120 at ICBM bases; and the U.S. providing information on the number and location of Castor 120 stages produced.

14. (S) Boryak said that the U.S. Delegation had previously stated that it did not currently locate Castor 120 stages at ICBM bases. He asked a rhetorical question, if Castor 120s were not used as ICBM stages, why not state that they would not be located at ICBM bases? He said that it was hard for Russia to imagine that the United States Government could not control the production and movement of strategic arms such as the Castor 120 stage and provide reports on its movement in compliance with the 19th Agreed Statement. He wanted the U.S. to provide more details on how the 19th Agreed Statement applied to Castor 120. Boryak said that Russia found it hard to believe that the Castor 120 was produced by a private company for commercial use, since it was produced with the same equipment as the PK.

15. (S) Regarding Castor 120, Taylor said that the United States rejects any linkage of PK ICBMs with Castor 120. He noted that the Parties were aware of the U.S. position on this issue and that it had not changed. He said that he appreciated Russia's presentation and would report Russia's comments back to Washington for consideration.

16. (S) Boryak commented on the Vandenberg silo attribution issue by stating that the Russian position presented in detail during Part I of JCIC-XXVII had not changed. The Russian Delegation believed the U.S. action contradicted the fundamental provisions of the Treaty. Boryak declared that the U.S. offer to allow the Parties to visit the Vandenberg SLF before June 1, 2006 would not lift Russia's concerns about activities at the Vandenberg "Test Range." (Begin comment: The term "test range" was interpreted. End comment.) He concluded that Russia did not see the visit as useful, but reserved the right to re-open this issue.

17. (S) Taylor asked whether Russia intended to keep the visit offer on the agenda. Boryak reiterated the rejection for such a visit as it would not be feasible or useful in resolving their concerns.

18. (S) Shevtsov commented that certain Treaty provisions may no longer correspond with reality, but most issues could be resolved in the JCIC. Shevtsov suggested the offered visit may prove useful and recommended it be studied.

19. (S) Taylor concluded by reasserting two points made during Part I of JCIC XXVII: 1) The use of the attributed silos to launch non-accountable items is not prohibited by the Treaty and is, therefore, compliant; and 2) The attributed silos have been modified, not converted per the Treaty, and remain accountable. Boryak responded that Russia did not interpret the Treaty on the principle "whatever is not prohibited is allowed," and the attributed silos could be used only for the space launch of ICBMs and SLBMs.

TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS
(TIC) REVISTED

20. (S) Taylor raised the TIC issue by commending the working group on its steady progress. He said he was confident that this issue would soon be resolved and that the Parties were leaving the session in a positive direction.

21. (S) Boryak agreed with Taylor's assessment and added that the Parties found common ground for resolution and the JCIC discussions clarified points not identified before. Boryak closed the HOD portion of the meeting by reviewing the schedule for the next day. He called for a short break before the working group portion of the meeting convened.

RUSSIA RESPONDS TO U.S.-
PROPOSED TRIDENT RVOSI TEXT

22. (S) Fedorchenko began the working group discussions with comments by the Russian Delegation to the U.S.-proposed revised text provided earlier in the meeting. The Russians removed the reference to the benchmark measurement in the third paragraph.

23. (S) After a short break, Mullins said that the U.S. Delegation had narrowed down the problem to the language on what to do if measurements differ from the benchmark by more than 3 centimeters.

24. (S) Fedorchenko said that, hypothetically, there was a potential to continue measuring forever if the correct measurements were not obtained.

BUTTRICK SAVES THE DAY!

25. (S) Buttrick suggested deleting the specific language on what to do if measurements were not within tolerance, since the United States was confident that the inspecting Party would not obtain two measurements that would differ by more than 3 centimeters from the benchmark measurement. Mullins added that the Parties should allow the inspectors and escorts the flexibility to work out any problems.

26. (S) Fedorchenko agreed with this new proposal and offered a change to the language in the CPS to bring it in line with the new proposal. The Parties agreed that the U.S. would provide a joint draft text.

27. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed Language for the Draft Coordinated
Plenary Statement on Trident RVOSI, dated November 7, 2005.

128. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Maj. Mitchner
Mr. Singer
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. French
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Dr. Baichorov
Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Mr. Boryak
Col Yegorov
Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Kashirin
Ms. Kotkova
Amb Masterkov
Mr. Mezheny
Mr. Novikov
Col Razumov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Zaytsev
Mr. Fokin (Int)

Ukraine

Mr. Belashov
Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Dotsenko
Mr. Fedotov
Col Taran

129. (U) Taylor sends.
Cassel